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U.S. Policy Toward Human Rights in Latin
America: A Comparative Analysis of Two
Administrations*
LARS SCHOULTZ**
The purpose of this paper is to analyze two related aspects
of comparative human rights behavior: the comparative level
of human rights violations among twenty-three Latin Ameri-
can nations; and the comparative level of financial support of
human rights violations in Latin America by the Administra-
tions of Presidents Ford and Carter. The focus of the first com-
parison is on the advantages and shortcomings of a method
which attempts to rank governments on the basis of expert
evaluation of human rights performance. The latter compari-
son concentrates on the extent to which U.S. bilateral eco-
nomic and military aid supports those Latin American govern-
ments which repress their citizens' fundamental human rights.'
* Adapted from a presentation made at a conference on human rights hosted by
the International Legal Studies Program, College of Law, and the Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver, and the Department of Political Science,
University of Colorado (Boulder), and held in Denver-Boulder in Spring 1978.
** Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of North Car-
olina at Chapel Hill.
1. For a collection of cases studies, see, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR 1978 (1977). A large
body of literature exists on the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and var-
ious other types of behavior by recipient governments. See, e.g., Alpert & Bernstein,
International Bargaining and Political Coalitions: U.S. Foreign Aid and China's Ad-
mission to the U.N., 27 W. POL. Q. 314 (1974); D. BALDWIN, FOREIGN AID AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY: A DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS (1966); L. BLACK, THE STRATEGY OF FOREIGN
AID (1968); J. Dunn, Military Aid and Military Elites: The Political Potential of
American Training and Technical Assistance Programs (1961) (Ph. D. dissertation,
Princeton U.); G. EDER, INFLATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE HISTORY
OF INFLATION AND STABILIZATION IN BOLIVIA (1968); H. FEIS, FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN
POLICY (1966); Griffin & Enos, Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences, 18
ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 313 (1970) (for a critique, see Over, An Example of
the Simultaneous-Equation Problem: A Note on 'Foreign Assistance: Objectives and
Consequences, '23 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 751 (1975); J. HOLCOM3E & A. BERG,
MAP FOR SECURITY: MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES (1957); H.
HOVEY, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE: A STUDY OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1965);
Kaplan, The Distribution of Aid to Latin America: A Cross-National Aggregate Data
and Time Series Analysis, 10 J. DEV. AREAS 37 (1975); Kaplan, US. Arms Transfers
to Latin America, 1945-1974: Rational Strategy, Bureaucratic Politics, and Executive
Parameters, 19 INT'L STUD. Q. 399 (1975); Kaplan, United States Aid and Regime
Maintenance in Jordan, 1957-1973, 23 PUB. POL'Y 189 (1975); Kato, A Model of U.S.
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In both cases, human rights are defined narrowly, encompas-
sing only the physical integrity of the person. The human
right concerned, then, is that of freedom from torture and
other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,
including prolonged detention without trial.'
The issue of United States support for repressive govern-
ments through its foreign aid program has received an extraor-
dinary amount of attention from scholars and policy makers. 3
Foreign Aid Allocation: An Application of a Rational Decision-Making Scheme, in
APPROACHES TO MEASUREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 198 (J. Mueller ed. 1969);
Lefever, The Military Assistance Training Program, 424 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
Sci. 85 (1976); E. MASON, FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN POLICY (1964); Miller,
Underdevelopment and US. Foreign Policy, in STRUGGLE AGAINST HISTORY: U.S. FOR-
EIGN POLICY IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION 136 (N. Houghton ed. 1968); Packenham,
Political Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program, 18 WORLD POL.
194 (1966); F. Pancake, Military Assistance as an Element of U.S. Foreign Policy in
Latin America, 1950-1968 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, U. of Virginia); Sylvan,
Consequences of Sharp Military Assistance Increases for International Conflict and
Cooperation, 20 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 609 (1976); R. WALTERS, AMERICAN AND SOVIET
AID: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1970); A. WESTWOOD, FOREIGN AID IN A FOREIGN POLICY
FRAMEWORK (1966); Wittkopf, The Concentration and Concordance of Foreign Aid
Allocations: A Transaction-Flow Analysis, in LOCATIONAL APPROACHES TO POWER AND
CONFLICT (K. Cox & D. Reynolds eds. 1974); Wittkopf, Containment Versus Underde-
velopment in the Distribution of United States Foreign Aid: An Introduction to the
Use of Crossnational Aggregate Data Analysis in the Study of Foreign Policy, in A
MULTI-METHOD INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITCS 174 (W. Coplin & C. Kegley
eds. 1971); Wittkopf, Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study,
67 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 868 (1973); E. WrrrKOPF, WESTERN BILATERAL AID ALLOCATIONS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RECIPIENT STATE ATTRIBUTES AND AID RECEIVED (1972); C.
WOLF, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (1965) (Rand Corp. pub. P-3240).
For instructive studies of the use of aid to pursue public policy, see Lipson,
Corporate Preferences and Public Policies: Foreign Aid Sanctions and Investment
Protection, 28 WORLD POL. 396 (1976); McKinlay & Little, A Foreign Policy Model of
US. Bilateral Aid Allocation, 30 WORLD POL. 58 (1977); and J. NELSON, AID, INFLUENCE
AND FOREIGN POLICY (1968).
2. This definition corresponds to that found in the International Development
and Food Assistance Act of 1975, § 310, 22 U.S.C. 2151n(a) (1976). After lengthy
hearings by various congressional committees, Congress accepted Richard Falk's rec-
ommendation that legislation focus on the areas in which a genuine international
consensus existed as to the character of the rights involved. For the most comprehen-
sive discussion in English of the definition of human rights, see V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES, AND WORLD COMMUNITY 9-102 (1970). A briefer historical
description of the evolution of current definitions of human rights is Claude, The
Classical Model of Human Rights Development, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (R.
Claude ed. 1976). Falk's suggestion is offered in International Protection of Human
Rights: Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 246, 247 (1973) (statement
of Richard Falk).
3. Arlin, The Organizers, FAR. E. EcON. REV., July 2, 1973, at 16; Baines, U.S.
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Military Assistance to Latin America, 14 J. INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 469, 485
(1972); R. BARNET, INTERVENTION AND REVOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES IN THE THIRD
WORLD 301-34 (1968); D. BAYLEY, PUBLIC LIBERTIES IN THE NEW STATES 2 (1964); Brews-
ter, Foreign Military Training Bolsters Free World, ARMY DIG., May 1965, at 16;
Clarke, U.S. Military Assistance in Latin America, id. Sept. 1966, at 18; Dunn & Jones,
Preventive Medicine Civil Action Training Program, 18 AIR U. REV. 21 (1966); Grant,
Training, Equipping the Latin American Military, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 16, 1967, at 13;
Gruening, Exporting Trouble, 195 THE NATION 194 (1962); Gutteridge, The Impact of
Foreign Aid upon the Political Role of the Armed Forces in Developing Countries, in
THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 217, 225-26 (R. Cox ed. 1969); T. HAYTER,
AID AS IMPERIALISM 97-98, 138, 152 (1971); Hughes, The Myth of Military Coups and
Military Assistance, 47 MIL. REV. at 4, 7 (1967); REPRESSION IN LATIN AMERICA 154, 157-
60 (W. Jerman ed. 1975) (report on first session of second Russell Tribunal, Rome,
April 1974); Kaplan, United States Military Aid to Brazil and the Dominican Repub-
lic: Its Nature, Objectives and Impact, in Symposium on Arms Control, Military Aid
and Military Rule in Latin America (U. of Chicago, May 1972); Lernoux, Church
Cowed by Uruguayan Military (Jan. 18, 1977) (Alicia Patterson Foundation rep. no.
PL-7); J. MONTGOMERY, THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA 252 (1962); 0berg, Arms Trade with the Third World as an Aspect of
Imperialism, 12 J. PEACE RESEARCH 213 (1975); Payer, Third World Debt Problems:
The New Wave of Defaults, MONTHLY REV., Sept. 1976, at 13; Powell, Military Assis-
tance and Militarism in Latin America, 18 W. POL. Q. 382, 388 (1965); Rowe, Aid and
Coups d'Etat: Aspects of the Impact of American Military Assistance Programs in the
Less Developed Countries, 18 INT'L STUD. Q. 239 (1974); Schmitter, Foreign Military
Assistance, National Military Spending and Military Rule in Latin America, in
MILITARY RULE IN LATIN AMERICA 117 (P. Schmitter ed. 1973); Shestack & Cohen,
International Human Rights: A Role for the United States, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 673, 676
(1974); Styron, Uruguay: The Oriental Republic, 223 THE NATION 107, 111 (1976);
THAYER, THE WAR BUSINESS: THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ARMAMENTS 119-200 (1969);
U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, IF YOU WANT PEACE, DEFEND LIFE 18-20 (1976); Victor,
Military Aid and Comfort to Dictatorships, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC., March 1969, at
43-47; Weaver, Arms Transfers to Latin America: A Note on the Contagion Effect, 11
J. PEACE RESEARCH 213 (1974); S. WEISSMAN, THE TRoJAN HORSE: A RADICAL LOOK AT
FOREIGN AID (1975); C. WOLF, THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF MILITARY PROGRAMS: SOME
INDICATIONS FROM LATIN AMERICA 38 (1963) (Rand Corp. memorandum RM-3676-ISA);
M. WOLPIN, MILITARY AID AND COUNTERREVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (1972); and
Wriggins, Political Outcome of Foreign Assistance: Influence, Involvement or
Intervention? 22 J. INT'L AFF. 217 (1968).
Congressional hearings are packed with testimony on both sides of this issue. See,
e.g., Foreign Assistance Authorization: Examination of US. Foreign Aid Programs and
Policies: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance of the Sen. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 424-84 (1975). For prototypic responses of the
State Department, see Treatment of Political Prisoners in South Vietnam by the
Government of the Republic of South Vietnam: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
58-62 (1973); Political Prisoners in South Vietnam and the Philippines: Hearings be-
fore the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 87-89 (1974); and International Protection of Human
Rights: Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 820-21 (1973) (letter
containing partial transcripts of State Department press briefings by C. Bartch).
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While it is impossible to deny that the U.S. Government has
helped to finance some of the most repressive regimes in Latin
America, no comparative data are available to support the as-
sertion that the United States systematically directs its foreign
assistance to governments which violate their citizens' human
rights. Since 1972, Freedom House, a New York-based nongov-
ernmental human rights organization, has conducted a semian-
nual "Comparative Survey of Freedom" which ranks each of
the world's nation states and most of their territories and de-
pendencies on their respect for both political and civil rights.
The survey, unfortunately, is based almost exclusively upon
the western European and U.S. tradition of individual free-
dom. This, along with Freedom House's undisguised hostility
toward socialist economies, renders its rankings of human
rights performance somewhat inconsistent.' The only other
crossnational comparison of human rights behavior is James
Seymour's valuable contribution which ises as its measure of
human rights repression the number of political prisoners per
capita. 5 The major weakness in Seymour's analysis is that data
on political prisoners do not exist for a large number of states;
in the case of Latin America, Seymour could obtain reliable
data on only about half of the countries in the region.
DATA AND PROCEDURES
In order to measure the comparative level of human rights
violations in Latin America, a collective assessment was made
by surveying a group of individuals who have devoted their
lives to the international protection of human rights. When
research for this paper was initiated in early 1976, the universe
of experts on comparative human rights in the Western non-
communist world totaled approximately ninety-one persons.
They were defined as the persons who had published widely on
the subject or who occupied key positions in nongovernmental
and governmental human rights orgainizations. Rather than
sample this surprisingly small number of experts, question-
naires were sent to each of them. From among the eighty-seven
4. The director of the Freedom House survey is aware of and defends the emphasis
on the Western European tradition of freedom. See Gastil, The Comparative Survey
of Freedom- VI, FREEDOM AT ISSUE 5, 12 (Jan.-Feb. 1976).
5. Seymour, Human Rights as a Social Science Sub-Discipline, ANN. MEETING
INT'L STUD. A. 15-16 (March 1977).
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Third World nations which received U.S. foreign aid between
1962 (the fiscal year in which the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 began to operate) and 1976, respondents were asked to
rank only those nations with whose human rights record they
were familiar on a scale of ascending violations of from one to
four, using as a time frame the calendar year 1976.
After two letters to many potential respondents, a number
of telephone calls, and six months of waiting, the response rate
reached a respectable forty-two percent. As might have been
expected, given the specialized nature of the subject, the
thirty-eight respondents formed a fairly homogeneous group. In
terms of their primary occupations, twelve were employees of
nongovernmental human rights organizations (NGOs), eight
were professors of international law, seven were social scien-
tists, six were practicing attorneys, three were members of na-
tional parliaments, and two were U.S. congressional staff mem-
bers. All of the attorneys, social scientists, and professors of
international law were closely associated with at least one
NGO. Most of the respondents had some firsthand knowledge
of human rights protection in Latin America, generally gained
through participation in an investigation sponsored by nongov-
ernmental organizations. Many had participated in several
investigations. As to their nationalities, thirty-two respondents
were from the United States and Canada, five were from var-
ious European nations, and one was from Latin America. This
disappointing distribution was the result of an extremely low
response rate by experts from outside the United States.
Nearly half of the potential respondents were not U.S. citizens.
In order to reduce some of the hazards of interregional
comparisons, the global assessment of the relationship between
U.S. aid and human rights violations was reduced in scope to
consider only the twenty-three aid-receiving nations of Latin
America.' The dependent variable, then, was the experts' mean
evaluation of the level of human rights violations by each Latin
American government in 1976. This variable had a range of
2.79 (1.00 to 3.79), a mean of 2.35, and a standard deviation of
6. Latin America is defined to include all nations whose aid disbursements are
wholly or partially controlled by the Department of State's Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs. Included, therefore, are Guyana, Jamaica, Surinam, and Trinidad and To-
bago.
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.87. Table 1 presents this composite assessment of human
rights performance by Latin American governments.
Table 1. Level of Human Rights Violations
(Latin America, 1976)
Rank Ordera
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
9
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
20
22
23
Country
Costa Rica
Trinidad and Tobago
Surinam
Jamaica
Venezuela
Colombia
Guyana
Mexico
Ecuador
Panama
Peru
Honduras
El Salvador
Dominican Republic
Bolivia
Nicaragua
Guatemala
Haiti
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Argentina
Chile
Mean Expert
Assessment
(N = 38)
1.00
1.13
1.36
1.43
1.48
1.52
1.56
1.85
2.05
2.05
2.13
2.19
2.35
2.43
2.61
2.95
3.00
3.33
3.35
3.44
3.44
3.59
3.79
a In ascending level of human rights violations.
This technique of creating a comparative ranking of
human rights violations has the advantage of producing find-
ings which are reasonably valid. In general terms, the countries
are more or less properly ranked. Certainly there will always be
arguments among Latin Americanists in ranking the region's
twenty-three nations along any dimension, but most scholars
will agree that the ranking in Table 1 presents a fairly accurate
comparison. The technique of expert evaluation is much more
valuable in identifying the extreme cases than in accurately
ranking those nations which tend to be grouped together in the
middle.
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The disadvantages of using the technique of expert evalua-
tion to compare governments' human rights behavior are, how-
ever, considerable. One problem is the varying level of exper-
tise among the respondents. A few were extremely knowledge-
able about a single country, but their "vote on that country
carried no more weight in this survey than that of any other
respondent. Although the group of experts was chosen with
extreme care, given the complexity and diversity of the Latin
American region, it was not possible to select respondents with
equal levels of expertise for each nation. An additional problem
arising from this variance was the fluctuating number of coun-
tries ranked by each respondent. Some experts ranked all
twenty-three Latin American nations, while others commented
on just a few. This problem was resolved by selecting a totally
arbitrary cutoff: the thirty-eight respondents who ranked
twenty or more nations were included. All the other responses
were left uncoded in a file drawer, despite the fact that some
of them were by highly esteemed authorities.
A second disadvantage of the technique of expert assess-
ment is methodological, and has its origin, perhaps, in a per-
sonality characteristic of lawyers. A brief pretest of the ques-
tionnaire demonstrated that the desired interval scale of
human rights behavior could not be used with attorneys, nearly
all of whom refused to rank governments by numbers alone.
Although social scientists and NGO personnel were content to
use only numbers, the lawyers demanded some descriptive
phrase beside each number. In providing this description, the
questionnaire provided the basis for creating an ordinal rather
than an interval scale. A rating of "four" is still worse than a
"three," but it is impossible to determine whether the experts
responded in such a way that the interval between three and
four can be considered equal to that between two and three.
Thus, it is inappropriate to compute the mean expert assess-
ment presented in Table 1. As a result, it is incorrect to as-
sume, for example, that the fifty-two points between Costa
Rica and Colombia are the equivalent of the fifty-two points
between the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. They might
be, but there is no way to know for sure. The fact that a large
majority of the respondents resorted to half points suggests
that many experts did perceive the scale as interval, but this
is hardly a sufficient reason to disregard the potential limita-
tions of the data.
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A third disadvantage is that the exercise tends to become
trivialized. The results are challenged by such questions as "Is
Argentina really worse than Uruguay?" or "Should Surinam be
considered a part of Latin America?" Once large amounts of
time have been invested in an exercise of this sort, there is a
natural tendency not only for the author to defend it vigorously
but also for others to attribute a greater degree of validity to
the data than an objective analysis would deem proper. This
is particularly true in cases which yield quantifiable results.
Because the data appear to be "hard," researchers tend to
squeeze them a bit too much, to use inappropriate statistical
techniques, to carry calculations too far to the right of the
decimal point.
Given an imperfect instrument, then, commentary re-
volves around an analysis of its flaws, and in this process one
somehow tends to forget that the goal of all this is to contribute
to a reduction in the level of torture in Latin America. If the
basic method of expert evaluation is to be used in the future,
perhaps what should be attempted is a gross ordinal classifica-
tion similar in certain ways to the much maligned Freedom
House categories. Governments should be classified as, say,
extremely repressive, moderately repressive, or relatively non-
repressive. Rather than judging on the basis of all human
rights, however, experts could be asked to consider only the
fundamental right to the physical integrity of the person. This,
I believe, would effectively eliminate some of the most obvious
shortcomings of the technique which produced Table 1, and
would, therefore, permit us to turn to a more relevant topic:
how and to what extent our government is involved in encour-
aging or discouraging the violation of human rights in Latin
America.
THE FORD AND CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS
The principal subject of this paper is the comparative level
of support for human rights violations in Latin America by the
two most recent U.S. administrations. While there are a num-
ber of ways to express this support, perhaps it is most clearly
observed in the U.S. bilateral aid program. The comparisons
below are based upon FY1975 and proposed FY1979 aid from
the Agency for International Development (AID), the Food for
Peace (PL480) program, and from four different types of mili-
tary aid. The FY1975 aid distributions reflect the priorities of
U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA
the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policy toward Latin America, while
those for FY1979 are the first relatively pure reflections of the
Carter administration's preferences.
Using the data on human rights from Table 1 and the
FY1975 aid disbursements, Figure 1 presents the relationship
between the level of human rights violations in Latin America
in 1976 and the receipt of U.S. aid during FY1975. This scatter-
plot describes quite vividly the limited extent to which human
rights considerations were included in the Ford administra-
tion's foreign assistance decisionmaking.
FIGURE I. Scatterplot of the Relationhip between US. Aid to
Ltin America in FY 1975 and the Le'el of Hoan
Rights Viottion by Recipient Gonernnt in
1976.
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It is clearly evident that U.S. aid at this time tended to flowdisproportionately to those Latin American governments which
tortured their citizens. The Pearson correlation for Figure 1 is
+.68. Even given a low N and an imperfect instrument to
measure human rights violations, a correlation of this magni-
tude is highly unusual in studies of other aspects of the U.S.
foreign aid program. Although it is incorrect to use these
findings to make causal analyses, if in 1975 one were interested
in making a safe bet on how the Ford-Kissinger administration
would distribute its foreign aid, perhaps the best available in-
dicator would have been the level of recipients' violations of
human rights.
1979
600 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 8:591
The scatterplot is composed of two clusters of nations. One
group of seven countries was ranked relatively low in its level
of repressiveness and received relatively little, if any, economic
or military assistance from the United States. The other six-
teen nations are all ranked higher in their repression of human
rights, and all received relatively large amounts of U.S. aid.
The only major exception among the twenty-three nations is
Colombia. While Figure 1 describes the relationship between
human rights and absolute levels of aid, the relationship holds
for relative (per capita) aid levels as well. Most of the twenty-
three nations do not change their position in the scatterplot
when population is considered, and those few that do change
are replaced by other nations with similar human rights re-
cords. Very populous Brazil, for example, drops precipitously
when per capita rather than absolute aid levels are considered,
but Nicaragua makes a commensurate rise and thereby cancels
the potential decline in the positive relationship between U.S.
aid and human rights violations.
The relationship between Latin American governments'
repression of human rights in 1976 and the Carter administra-
tion's proposed aid distributions for FY1979 is presented in
Figure 2. Between 1975 and 1979 some very substantial changes
occurred in the distribution of U.S. economic and military as-
sistance.
FIGURE 2. Scatt-rplot of the Relatioohip betw n U.S. Aid to
Lotio Amterio in FY 1979 and the Lenol of Huoan
Rights Violatir- by Recipient Gonernmeht in
1976.
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Most of the extremely repressive governments in Latin Amer-
ica now receive substantially less aid than in earlier years.
Indeed, two countries, Argentina and Uruguay, were com-
pletely omitted from the Carter administration's request to
Congress, although to some extent the aid "pipeline" is still
open to Argentina. Along with these two nations, Brazil, Chile,
and Nicaragua declined dramatically in the receipt of U.S. aid
between FY1975 and FY1979. It must be emphasized, however,
that much of the credit for these aid reductions should go to
Congress, especially in the cases of Chile, Nicaragua, and Uru-
guay. And in the case of Nicaragua, there was some evidence
that the Administration might yield to pressure from the po-
tent Nicaraguan lobby and free a large amount of previously
blocked aid funds for the Somoza dictatorship.7
Two further points underline the differences between U.S.
aid policies under the Ford and Carter administrations. First,
several nations with high levels of respect for human
rights-Costa Rica, Guyana, and Jamaica-are now receiving
much more aid from the United States than they have in the
past. During the Kissinger era it was rumored that Guyana and
Jamaica were considered as targets for "destabilization" pro-
grams because of their governments' slight tilts to the left of
center. In 1979 they are scheduled to be among the region's
major aid recipients. Second, those Latin American nations
with very repressive governments which nonetheless remain
major aid recipients-Bolivia, Guatemala, and Haiti-are
among the neediest in the region, and U.S. aid programs in
these countries are designed to reach only the neediest social
sectors. 8 This is also true of the much reduced Food for Peace
program in Chile, where all commodities will now be channeled
not through the Pinochet government but rather through pri-
vate voluntary organizations, such as Catholic Relief Services.
Congress approved of these "needy people" exceptions when it
inserted clauses in human rights sections of economic assis-
tance legislation permitting the President to ignore a recipient
7. Wash. Post., May 16, 1978, at Al, col. 6; and id. at A18, col. 1.
8. An exception to this is an unexplained request for $6.5 million in foreign mili-
tary sales credits for Bolivia.
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government's abuses of human rights so long as the provision
of U.S. aid will directly benefit needy people
Overall, even the most unrelenting critics of U.S. foreign
policy will have to admit that the performance of the Carter
administration in dissociating the U.S. bilateral aid program
from unusually repressive Latin American governments is im-
pressive. 0 At the very least, the values displayed by the FY1979
aid request are far different from those of four years earlier. In
1975, human rights activists were attacking the entire direction
of the U.S. aid program, including such notorious cases as the
distribution of eighty-five percent of Latin America's Title I
PL480 funds to the Pinochet regime in Chile. In 1978, the same
groups were attacking the exceptional cases. In fact, the best
indication of how much change has occurred is the datum that
in 1978 human rights groups concentrated their energies upon
a miniscule $150,000 grant to Nicaragua for military training.
A FURTHER COMPARISON
Comparatively speaking, there is much to praise about the
Carter administration's aid-related policy toward human
rights in Latin America. But bilateral aid to Latin America is
a restricted area of U.S. foreign policy, and it might be wise to
compare this area with other aspects of the Administration's
efforts to promote human rights. One of these areas should be
U.S. bilateral assistance to non-Latin American countries.
Here those who would reduce to a bare minimum all U.S. aid -
to repressive regimes are less than euphoric with the current
Administration, for its FY1979 budget request suggests that a
number of repressive governments continue to be favorites of
our national security planners. South Korea is scheduled for
$336 million, Indonesia for $228 million, and the Philippines for
$143 million from the various U.S. bilateral aid programs in
FY1979. These three nations, with unusually repressive re-
gimes, are programmed to receive more than twice the total aid
9. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1976).
10. The only unmentioned major change in Figure 2 is an increase in aid to the
increasingly repressive Mexican Government. It should be noted, however, that all
U.S. aid to Mexico is for the purpose of narcotics control. The program therefore should
not be considered foreign aid in the strict sense of the word, since the paraquat pur-
chased with these funds eventually lodges in the lungs of U.S. citizens.
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to all of Latin America's twenty-three nations. The protesta-
tions of AID notwithstanding, it is ludicrous to suggest that the
governments of these three countries are going to use much of
this money to help their poverty stricken masses. The purpose
of our aid is variously said to be support for "friendly" govern-
ments (the Indonesia argument), national security (the Philip-
pine bases argument), the sanctity of our word as expressed in
earlier Cold War commitments (the South Korea argument),
or some other argument which cannot mask the fact that under
the current Administration the U.S. aid program continues to
support some of the world's most egregious violators of human
rights. It is relatively easy for aid decisionmakers to be tough
with Latin America's repressive governments. The true test of
the Carter administration's human rights mettle is in areas
where competing values challenge that of the protection of
human rights. In these areas, human rights have been subordi-
nated to a variety of traditional foreign policy concerns.
A second area to which U.S. bilateral aid to Latin America
can be compared is that of multilateral aid. With the strong
support of Congress, the Carter administration has worked to
incorporate human rights considerations into multilateral aid
policies. Nevertheless, its activities in this area cannot yet be
described as vigorous, except perhaps in the Inter-American
Development Bank. The Administration officials responsible
for U.S. participation in international financial institutions
(IFIs), Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal and Assist-
ant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs C. Fred
Bergsten, have actively opposed efforts by Congress to add
human rights sections to legislation authorizing U.S. participa-
tion in IFIs.1 Their argument, like that of Henry Kissinger in
the case of human rights and bilateral aid, is that the Adminis-
tration requires "flexibility" in the conduct of foreign relations.
In addition, loan requests from a number of very repressive
governments continue to receive "yes" votes from U.S. direc-
tors of multilateral banks. While a growing list of negative
11. See Blumenthal's statement in 124 CONG. REC. H1403, H1406 (daily ed. Feb.
23, 1978) (letter of Sec. Blumenthal) and Bergsten's testimony in Foreign Assistance
and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1978, Part 1: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Foreign Operations Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 139, 206, 513-14 (1977) (statement of Ass't Sec. Bergsten).
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votes is encouraging, the overworked staff of the State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs has
not yet been able to exert its influence over loans to a suffi-
ciently wide range of nations."2 Specifically, the Bureau simply
does not have the human resources needed to counter claims
by other, more experienced bureaucratic entities that a given
loan to a repressive government will directly benefit needy peo-
ple. The Bureau, therefore, tends to flag loans to certain gov-
ernments for special attention by the Christopher Committee
and to sputter ineffectually at others. This, of course, may
change as the Bureau matures, but in the meantime human
rights considerations are less regularly incorporated in U.S.
multilateral aid policy than they are in bilateral aid to Latin
America.
In a third area, that of commercial transactions by U.S.-
based corporations, the Carter administration has failed to use
its full influence to promote human rights. In 1978 the Admin-
istration chose to support neither a general human rights
amendment to the Export-Import Bank authorization bill nor
a specific one which would restrict Eximbank participation in
financing the investments of multinational corporations in
South Africa. In addition, it has been alleged that the Com-
merce Department is carrying on an active program of encour-
aging the export of "gray area" armaments to repressive gov-
ernments. One example involves the sale of military aircraft
components to Brazil for eventual resale to Chile. Turned down
by the Arms Export Control Board, it is alleged that the De-
partment then contrived to have the weapon redefined so that
it could be removed from the Munitions List and exported
without the Board's approval. 3 Finally, it is the Congress and
not the Administration which has taken the lead in attempting
12. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Mark Schneider,
stated in 1978 that during 1977 the United States opposed twenty loans by IFIs on
human rights grounds, and that at least a dozen loan requests were withdrawn when
the U.S. made clear its opposition to them. For a list of seventeen opposing votes, six
of which were against Argentina, see Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Review
of the Administration's Record: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Or-
ganizations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
14 (1977).
13. Arnson & Klare, Pipeline to Pinochet: Law or No Law, the Arms Flow, 226
THE NATION 502 (1978).
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to curtail major corporate investments and loans by private
banks to repressive governments which have been declared in-
eligible for U.S. aid. When Rep. Henry Reuss (D-WI) of the
House Banking Committee asked six New York banks to ex-
plain why they were undermining U.S. foreign policy by con-
tinuing to loan unusually large sums of money to the Chilean
government, the Carter administration decided to ignore the
issue. 14
Initially, many members of the Carter administration
seemed not to have received the message that human rights are
to be promoted aggressively. However, an active alliance be-
tween nongovernmental human rights groups and human
rights activists within the Administration is perhaps responsi-
ble for conveying the message to persons such as the former
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Ter-
ence A. Todman, who was moved to the U.S. Embassy in Mad-
rid. Overall, however, it would be a grave error to underesti-
mate the number of U.S. foreign policy officials who are wait-
ing quietly for the human rights issue to disappear. The plea
of these people, whether it concerns IFI loans or Food for Peace
allocations, is that they must be allowed to "de-politicize" the
U.S. aid program. Most of them are sufficiently sophisticated
to realize that the global distribution of resources will always
be political. Their aim is not to "de-politicize" aid but to "de-
fuse" human rights considerations. It would be lamentable if
human rights activists, looking at encouraging data from the
U.S. bilateral aid program to Latin American, were lulled into
a complacency which permitted these officials to succeed in
their efforts.
14. Wash. Post., Apr. 12, 1978, at A9, col. 1; and id., Apr. 13, 1978, at A19, col. 1.
See also the study by I. Letelier & M. Moffitt, Human Rights, Economic Aid and
Private Banks: The Case of Chile (The Transnational Institute, April, 1978 (mimeo)).
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